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CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: IS A 
SPECIALIZED COURT THE SOLUTION?  
Darcey J. Goelz† 
Abstract:  China’s economic growth has come at a high price:  environmental and 
natural resource destruction.  Presently, China’s legal system is not prepared to protect 
China’s environmental resources.  China’s State Council has expressed an interest in 
establishing a civil and administrative system to manage environmental matters.  Some of 
the objectives expressed by the State Council could be achieved by creating a special 
tribunal to address environmental issues, similar to New Zealand’s Environment Court.  
A specialized court promotes environmental protection, and specialization creates experts 
in a specific field, allowing for consistency among decisions.  An environmental court 
will fit into China’s current legal system because Chinese law expressly authorizes 
specialized courts.  In fact, China already has specialized courts, including special 
maritime courts.  The creation of a specialized court would not be a panacea for China’s 
environmental problems, but it is a fundamental first step. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental pollution in China is a profoundly urgent concern—
and for good reason.  China is faced with severe environmental challenges 
that must be met in order to prevent the destruction of the forests, the 
extinction of species,1 the loss of land to desert, and the disappearance of 
potable water.2  The impact of environmental damage is not limited to the 
environment; it also affects the people that live there.  China’s lack of legal 
environmental protection results in toxic living conditions and leaves 
environmental advocates without tools to protect the environment and 
themselves.  For instance, some citizens wear gas masks to get to work,3 
while other citizens are arrested for photographing illegal chemical 
discharges.4  In the time leading up to the Beijing Olympics, China’s 
environmental problems steadily rose to the forefront of the world’s 
                                                 
†  I am indebted to many, but I must first thank my dad—for his guidance and assistance with drafts 
of this and many other papers over the years—and my mom—for providing her loving support and calm.  
To each of my editors, you have been a life-saver and I could not begin to thank you enough.  Finally, I 
must thank Professor Dongsheng Zang for his remarks on this comment and our intriguing conversations 
over the year. 
1  See Jim Yardley, Choking on Growth: Part VI, China’s Turtles, Emblems of a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 5, 2007. 
2  See Jim Yardley, Choking on Growth: Part II, Beneath Booming Cities, China’s Future is Drying 
Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007 [hereinafter Yardley, Part II]. 
3  See Jim Yardley, Choking on Growth: Part X, Beijing’s Olympic Quest: Turn Smoggy Sky Blue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007. 
4  See Joseph Kahn, Choking on Growth: Part III, In China, a Lake’s Champion Imperils Himself, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007. 
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attention.  These environmental problems are due primarily to the country’s 
rapid economic development, but the country’s tumultuous history and 
problems of corruption are also factors.  Seemingly at odds with its 
environmental record, China has an extensive framework of progressive 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies.  Unfortunately, these laws are 
often not implemented or enforced.5  China’s government recognizes the 
need to reform its legal system to address environmental challenges.6 
China has the potential to protect and restore the country’s natural 
environment.  To do so, China’s leaders must strengthen the institutions 
responsible for environmental protection and the “necessary adjunct 
institutions such as the judiciary.”7  Of the many possible approaches to 
addressing the environmental crisis in China, the Chinese government 
appears willing to embrace a specialized environmental court.  In 2005, the 
State Council8 issued a decision regarding environmental protection.9  One 
of the provisions in the decision implicitly suggests the country harbors a 
desire to establish a specialized forum for environmental actions.10  This 
                                                 
5  See Richard J. Ferris, Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, Reaching Out to the Rule of Law: China’s Continuing 
Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 569, 589, 594-
601 (2003).  The State Council asserted that “the environmental protection legal system is not 
complete . . . and where laws exist they are not followed and enforcement is not strict.”  State Council, 
Decision in Relation to Materializing Scientific Development Vision for the Strengthening of 
Environmental Protection, No. 39 of 2005 (Dec. 3, 2005) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter State Council Decision], 
translated in part in 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 201 (2006-2007).  However, the author of this article translated 
the name of the Decision as the “Decision on Implementation of Scientific Development and Strengthening 
on Environmental Protection.”  Alex Wang¸ The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China: 
Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 201 (2006-2007). 
6  Wang¸ supra note 5, at 197. 
7  See ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO 
CHINA’S FUTURE 92 (2004) [hereinafter ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK]. 
8  The State Council is China’s highest executive and state administrative body.  Wang¸ supra note 
5, at 197.  The State Council produces many of the country’s rules and regulations, and its objectives 
should not be easily dismissed.  Still, by no means does the State Council’s proclamation mean that any 
perceptible change will occur; the Chinese government has been criticized for rhetoric that does not result 
in any substantive change.  See China: Attacks on Media Violate Olympic Commitments, HUMAN RIGHTS 
NEWS, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/08/07/china16552.htm (last visited April 18, 
2008) (criticizing empty rhetoric about preventing obstruction of foreign journalists for the Olympic 
Games); Ke Zhang, China to Hold Provincial Officials Accountable for Environmental Harm, CHINA 
ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS DIGEST, Feb. 22, 2007, http://china-environmental-
news.blogspot.com/2007/02/china-to-hold-provincial-officials.html (last visited March 26, 2008) (almost 
half of the investment pledged to prevent environmental pollution was never provided).  See generally W. 
Scott Railton, Comment, The Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality Protection in China, 7 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 859 (1998) (stating that water pollution control measures will be mere rhetoric unless action is 
taken). 
9  State Council Decision, translated in Shun Yong Yeh, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 399 (2007). 
10  Nothing in the State Council Decision expressly states a desire to create a specialized court, but 
the Decision does imply that changes to the judicial system are a necessary step towards a healthier, cleaner 
environment.  See Shun Yong Yeh, Is China’s Development Path Sustainable? An Overview on the Legal 
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Comment outlines how China would benefit from the creation of a 
specialized court system for environmental issues. 
To date, there has been no move to develop such a specialized court 
within China, but courts in other countries could serve as precedents.11  The 
framework currently employed in New Zealand offers a useful model and it 
could be modified to conform to a structure similar to China’s other 
specialized courts, such as the maritime courts.  Such a court would have the 
expertise to appropriately handle environmental cases and would insulate 
judges from local pressure.  This Comment argues that a specialized court 
should be adopted to strengthen the country’s potentially powerful 
environmental regulatory framework. 
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of China’s major 
environmental issues.  Part III then discusses China’s legal system, including 
an assessment of its existing environmental legislation, a general overview 
of the country’s governmental structure with particular focus on the failure 
of the current judicial system, and a caveat that a specialized court is not a 
panacea for the difficulties facing China.  Part IV reviews two types of 
specialized courts that provide approximate potential models for a Chinese 
Environmental Court:  the Environment Court of New Zealand (“NZEC”) 
and China’s maritime courts.  Part V examines the viable structure, authority, 
jurisdiction, and standing requirements of a specialized environmental court 
in China.  Finally, Part VI analyzes the potential benefits of a specialized 
                                                                                                                                               
and Policy Framework in Relation to Environmental Protection in China, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 399, 439-46 (2007) (describing the provisions of the State Council Decision).  The 
Decision states that “The State shall . . . undertake researches on the establishment of a system for civil as 
well as administrative proceedings relating to environmental matters.”  Id. at 444.  The Decision also 
stated, as objectives, that the “[p]rocedure for prosecuting environmental crime shall be improved” and that 
“[t]he State shall coordinate cross provincial boundary law enforcement and environmental dispute.”  Id. at 
445.  The Council further expressed the desire to “resolve the problem caused by local protectionism.”  Id.  
See also Wang¸ supra note 5, at 197 (“In recent years, China has recognized the key role that the legal 
system must play in addressing ever-worsening environmental problems.  For example, the State Council, 
China's highest executive body, has specifically called for the ‘perfection of the legal assistance system for 
pollution victims, and research and establishment of an environmental civil and administrative public 
interest litigation system.’”). 
11  New Zealand has a prominent Environment Court, which will be discussed in more detail 
throughout this comment.  See infra Part IV.A.  New South Wales, Australia also has a specialist 
environmental and planning court.  See generally Land and Environment Court, 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lec.  India has the India National Environmental Tribunal and National 
Environmental Appellate Authority.  See Manjit Iqbal, Role of Judiciary in Providing Access to Justice and 
Enforcement, presented at the Asia Pacific Regional Conference on Environmental Justice and 
Enforcement (Jan. 14-16, 2008), 
www.roap.unep.org/program/Documents/Law08_presentations/Day1/Role_Judiciary_Manjit.ppt (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2008).  Bangladesh also created an Environment Court.  Id.  In addition, Thailand, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines have tribunals specializing in environmental matters.  See Carmel Crimmins 
& Darren Schuettler, Manila Creates Green Courts for Environmental Cases, REUTERS, January 14, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSSP16667 (last visited Aug. 10, 2008). 
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environmental court, including the advantages stemming from judicial 
expertise and awareness of a legal forum. 
II. CHINA FACES SEVERE ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
CHALLENGES 
China has numerous environmental problems that are interrelated and 
increasingly dangerous to both human health and ecosystems.  There are 
many explanations for these environmental problems, including China’s 
complicated history, the country’s rapid economic development, and the 
corrupting influence of local interests. 
A.  China Has a Variety of Environmental Problems that Combine to 
Raise Major Political, Social, Economic, and Health Concerns 
China must address its environmental problems for economic, social, 
political, and environmental reasons.  China’s primary environmental issues 
are water pollution, lack of water, air pollution, deforestation, and 
desertification.12  China must address these environmental problems 
because, among other things, the costs to the economy are crippling.13  The 
Communist Party of China (“CPC”) is also concerned that environmental 
damage will prompt social unrest.14  The Chinese government itself 
recognizes the costs of environmental pollution, as indicated by its 2005 
                                                 
12  For an additional overview of these and other environmental problems, see Eric W. Orts, 
Environmental Law with Chinese Characteristics, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 545, 549 (2003). 
13  See Elizabeth C. Economy, Environmental Enforcement in China, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND 
THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 102, 102 (Kristen Day ed., 2005) [hereinafter Economy, 
Environmental Enforcement].  “[T]he price tag for China’s environmental degradation and pollution is 
estimated to be the equivalent of 8% to 12% of its annual gross domestic product (GDP).”  Id. 
14  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 87.  In another article, Economy discussed a 
large protest in June 2007 against the construction of a petrochemical plant in Xiamen.  Elizabeth C. 
Economy, The Great Leap Backward?: The Costs of China’s Environmental Crisis, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
Sept. 1, 2007 [hereinafter Economy, The Great Leap].  She stated that the “Chinese leadership's greatest 
fear . . . [is] that its failure to protect the environment may someday serve as the catalyst for broad-based 
demands for political change.”  Id.  “In 2005, China was shaken by 51,000 pollution-triggered ‘public 
disturbances’—demonstrations or riots of a hundred or more people protesting the contamination of rivers 
and farms—according to the government’s own statistics.  (The real figures are almost certainly higher.).”  
Christina Larson, China’s Pollution Revolution: Contaminated Rivers and Farms Trigger Peasant Protests, 
WASHINGTON MONTHLY, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0712.larson2.html (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2008).  One such “public disturbance” resulted when a phosphate fertilizer factory caused 
widespread damage to crops and endangerment of human health.  Sun Xiangming, Is This ‘An Incident of 
Counterrevolutionary Destruction?’, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 277, 277 (Lester Ross & Mitchell A. Silk eds., 1987).  The local brigade continually implored the 
factory and the county to correct the problems, but to no avail.  Id.  Finally, “[i]n response to the masses’ 
strong and unanimous demand, and having no other recourse,” a local brigade pulled the “factory’s 
electricity switch in an expression of protest.”  Id. 
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declaration that “[e]nvironmental pollution and ecosystem destruction have 
caused enormous economic losses, harmed the health of the masses, and 
affected societal stability and environmental safety.”15  To provide a stable 
government16 and healthy society, China will have to rectify current, and 
prevent future, environmental and natural resource damage. 
Water pollution and water shortages are “China’s No. 1 environmental 
problem.”17  One report indicates that the groundwater aquifers in ninety 
percent of Chinese cities are polluted, and more than seventy-five percent of 
surface water in urban areas is unsuitable for drinking and fishing.18  This 
leaves hundreds of millions of people without access to safe drinking 
water.19  Worse still, the Chinese government has categorized almost thirty 
percent of the country’s river water as unsuitable to use even for agriculture 
or industry.20  These high levels of water pollution result primarily from the 
use of dirty industrial processes without modern environmental controls21 
combined with rampant industrial irresponsibility.22  In fact, “[w]ater 
pollution is so widespread that regulators say a major incident occurs every 
other day.”23  In addition, more than forty percent of China’s cities do not 
have a sewage treatment plant.24  The lack of sewers and general scarcity of 
clean water cause “nearly 700 million people [to] drink water contaminated 
with animal and human waste.”25  Major instances of water pollution only 
exacerbate the country’s increasing water shortages.  The country is so large 
that the availability of water varies depending on the region:  the country’s 
                                                 
15  See State Council Decision, supra note 5, at 201. 
16  “The Ministry of Public Security has ranked pollution among the top five threats to China’s peace 
and stability.”  Larson, supra note 14. 
17  Orts, supra note 12, at 551 (quoting Sheri Liao, who is the head of Global Village).  Global 
Village is an independent environmental group in China.  Id. 
18  Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14 (discussing a report by the government-run Xinhua 
News Agency). 
19  Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, Choking on Growth: Part I, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches 
Deadly Extremes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007 [hereinafter Kahn & Yardley, Part I] (“Nearly 500 million 
people lack access to safe drinking water.”). 
20  Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14. 
21  See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 70 (“Factories and municipalities dump 
their untreated waste directly into streams, rivers, and coastal waters”). 
22  See generally BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ, REGULATING LAND AND POLLUTION IN CHINA: LAWMAKING, 
COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT; THEORY AND CASES 191-209 (2006).  Rooij discusses the necessity of 
“secret illegal nightly discharges” for the survival of many small companies, whose size makes compliance 
economically infeasible.  Id. at 196. 
23  Yardley, Part II, supra note 2. 
24  See Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 10, at 413 (297 out of 661 cities do not have any sewage 
treatment plant).  One report estimates that “roughly 200 million people live in towns that possess no 
sanitation system other than ‘pipes that lead wastewater to the nearest ditch.’”  ECONOMY, THE RIVER 
RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 71 (quoting the China Human Development Report). 
25  Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14. 
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northern region faces profound water shortages,26 while in the south there is 
often destructive flooding.27 
Air pollution is another area of primary concern.  The Beijing 
Olympics pushed air quality to the forefront of government officials’ 
attention.  In an effort to protect athletes’ health, Beijing officials planned 
“to limit vehicle use, close factories and do everything in their power to 
bring blue skies to Beijing.”28  These are obviously only solutions for the 
very short-term. Air pollution is not just a problem in Beijing; throughout 
the country citizens breathe unhealthy air.29  Particulate matter is one major 
air pollutant that makes China’s air quality unhealthy.30  Particulate matter is 
a result of diesel exhaust, coal-fired power plants, and other sources.31  It is 
suspected to be the cause of “up to 90 percent of all deaths from outdoor air 
pollution.”32  Other problematic air pollutants include nitrogen oxide and 
sulfur dioxide.33  The emission of sulfur dioxide, principally caused by coal 
burning, leads to acid rains,34 and “China is now the largest source of SO2 
emissions in the world.”35  Sulfur dioxide (SO2) is a serious problem both 
nationally and internationally.  One-third of China is affected by acid rain36 
and neighboring countries have blamed China for acid rain occurrence 
within their borders.37 
                                                 
26  See Orts, supra note 12, at 552; Zachary Tyler, Note, Transboundary Water Pollution in China: 
An Analysis of the Failure of the Legal Framework to Protect Downstream Jurisdictions, 19 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 572, 576 (2006).  China is attempting to remedy this disparity and some of the attendant harms 
through major water diversion programs, such as the Three Gorges Dam.  See Orts, supra note 12, at 552.  
These water diversion projects have their own attendant environmental harms.  See id. 
27  See, e.g., Associated Press, China Floods Kill 57, 1M Flee, TIME, June, 15, 2008. 




29  See Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 19.  “Only 1% of the country’s 560 million city dwellers 
breathe air considered safe by the European Union.”  Id. 
30  See Orts, supra note 12, at 555.  “Airborne particulates in many cities are at two to five times the 
maximum concentrations recommended by the World Health Organization.”  Id. 
31  Keith Bradsher, Choking on Growth: Part VII, Trucks Power China’s Economy, at a Suffocating 
Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  See Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 19. 
35  The World Bank & The State Environmental Protection Administration, Cost of Pollution in 
China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages, at xi (Feb. 2007), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollutio
n.pdf. 
36  Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 10, at 407. 
37  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 72 (“Japan and South Korea also blame 
China for much of their problems with acid rain, a situation that has contributed to ongoing tensions in the 
region.”). 
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Deforestation and desertification are interrelated environmental 
problems.  Deforestation has caused such catastrophic flooding that most 
logging activities have been banned throughout the country.38  Widespread 
desertification in western and northern China is transforming arable land 
into desert.39  Although China has been fighting desertification through 
massive reforestation campaigns, these re-planting efforts are often 
unsuccessful.40  In fact, despite aggressive reforestation efforts, reports show 
that a quarter of the entire country has turned to desert.41  Desertification is a 
result of poor anti-erosion practices as “[c]enturies of deforestation, along 
with the overgrazing of grasslands and overcultivation of cropland, have left 
much of China's north and northwest seriously degraded.”42  Desertification 
is also problematic because it results in major dust storms.43 
B. There Is No Single Cause of China’s Environmental Problems  
Ample reasons exist to explain China’s environmental deterioration.  
Some primary causes include China’s traditional approach to the 
environment and the devastating effects of rule under Chairman Mao 
Zedong.  One of the more obvious reasons is the country’s primary focus on 
economic development.  Another factor is the existence of political and 
business influence and corruption at the local level. 
1. China’s Traditions and Political History Contributed to the Country’s 
Current Environmental Crisis  
Many traditional Chinese approaches to the environment have 
prevented successful environmental protection.44  China’s attitudes, 
institutions, and policies were, and to some extent still are, “rooted in and 
supported by traditional concepts and philosophies such as Confucianism.”45  
Confucianism promotes “man’s need to overcome nature in order to utilize it 
                                                 
38  See id. at 67; Orts, supra note 12, at 554. 
39  See Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14.  “The Gobi Desert, which now engulfs much of 
western and northern China, is spreading by about 1,900 square miles annually.”  Id.  The direct annual 
costs of desertification are estimated at $6.5 billion (USD).  Orts, supra note 12, at 553. 
40  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 123-24. 
41  Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14. 
42  Id. 
43  See Orts, supra note 12, at 553. 
44  See generally Robert P. Weller & Peter Bol, From Heaven-and-Earth to Nature: Chinese 
Concepts of the Environment and Their Influence on Policy Implementation, in ENERGIZING CHINA: 
RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 473, 473-99 (Michael McElroy et. 
al. eds., 1998). 
45  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 55. 
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for his own benefit.”46  While Confucian scholars held a variety of beliefs 
about the relationship between man and nature, man was the focus of most 
ideas.47  In addition to Confucianism, other schools of thought influenced 
China’s treatment of nature and the environment, including Buddhism, 
Taoism, and legalism.48 
As China transitioned to socialist rule, the environment continued to 
suffer.  The People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) was established in 1949,49 
and was led by Mao Zedong until his death in 1976.50  Chairman Mao’s 
leadership had devastating consequences for China’s environment and 
natural resources.  “[M]ajor environmental problems and institutional legal 
weakness are legacies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution.”51 
2. China’s Primary Focus on Economic Development Comes at the 
Expense of Environmental Degradation 
Although China’s history has had significant impacts on its 
environment, the country’s environmental problems persist because China 
continues to aggressively pursue economic growth.52  Since 1978, when the 
government first created a socialist market economy, China’s economy has 
continued to expand.53  In fact, until 1996, China's economy grew at an 
annual rate of almost ten percent.54  Even today, the pace of economic 
growth has lessened only slightly.55  Economic reform brought revolutionary 
changes to China,56 including raising hundreds of millions of Chinese people 
                                                 
46  Id. 
47  See id. at 31-33 for an explanation of the beliefs held by a variety of Confucian scholars. 
48  For a more complete survey of the effects of these philosophies on China’s environment, see id. at 
31-36. 
49  Wang Chenguang, Introduction: An Emerging Legal System, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 
1, 9 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997). 
50  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 59. 
51  Orts, supra note 12, at 557. 
52  Mao initiated two “revolutions” intended to “catapult China into Communism and surpass the 
industrial achievements of Great Britain and the United States.”  See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, 
supra note 7, at 51.  Both the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
severely damaged the natural environment.  Id. at 51-55.  In order to increase grain production, the country 
began filling lakes and harvesting forests to open land for farming.  Id. at 51-52, 54.  With a shift towards 
the industrial age and the production of iron and steel, factories were built without consideration for 
environmental protection measures.  Yuhong Zhao, Environmental Dispute Resolution in China, 16 J. 
ENVTL. L. 157, 157 (2004); see also ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 52. 
53  Orts, supra note 12, at 549. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 62.  The Chinese government may well 
be depending on continued economic growth to maintain power.  See Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 
19 (“the country’s authoritarian system is addicted to fast growth”).  China’s economic success has 
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out of poverty57 and bringing the country to the top of the world economy.58  
However, this economic growth creates numerous environmental problems 
because the growth derives primarily from the expansion of heavy industry 
and urbanization, both of which increase the use of coal.59  Many now 
question whether this fast-paced, environmentally unsustainable economic 
growth can continue.60 
3. Local Interests and Corruption Prevent the Enforcement of 
Environmental Laws 
Local political and business interests are often opposed to increased 
environmental protection, particularly because of the economic implications 
of requiring expensive equipment and procedures.61  This “local 
protectionism” is one reason that existing environmental laws are not 
enforced.62  The provincial and local governments that are authorized to 
implement and enforce national policies do not necessarily follow the central 
                                                                                                                                               
placated the public and provided benefits to government officials; but while prosperity continues to 
forestall demands for political change, a “major slowdown could incite social unrest, alienate business 
interests and threaten the party’s rule.”  Id.  One reason for the government’s greater focus on 
environmental matters is the CPC’s fear of social unrest stemming from major environmental pollution.  
See Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14; ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 87. 
57  See Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 19; see also ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra 
note 7, at 62. 
58  See T.N. Srinivasan, China, India and the World Economy 2 (Stan. Ctr, for Int’l Dev., Working 
Paper No. 286, 2006), available at http://scid.stanford.edu/pdf/SCID286.pdf (“In terms of absolute level of 
Gross National Income (GNI) at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates in 2004, China . . . was 
second largest in the World, second only to the United States”); Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 19 
(“rapid industrialization and urbanization have . . . made the country the world’s largest producer of 
consumer goods”). 
59  Kahn & Yardley, Part I, supra note 19 (“there is little question that growth came at the expense of 
the country’s air, land and water”).  “The economy is on a historic run, posting a succession of double-digit 
growth rates.  But the growth derives . . . from a staggering expansion of heavy industry and urbanization 
that requires colossal inputs of energy, almost all from coal, the most readily available, and dirtiest, 
source.”  Id. 
60  If China wishes to successfully transition to a global market economy, China will have to create a 
more sustainable economy and will have to discover ways to preserve the environmental resources on 
which social development depends.  Orts, supra note 12, at 549.  “[T]he rapidity of economic growth in 
China raises questions about its environmental sustainability.  China has paid for fast economic growth 
with widespread environmental damage.  To continue its successful transition to a global market economy, 
China must find ways to square the incentives of economic development with the preservation of the 
environmental resources on which social development depends.”  Id. 
61  See William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, The Limits of the Law in Addressing China’s 
Environmental Dilemma, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 405, 411 (Michael B. McElroy, et. al eds., 1998).  The authors state that 
environmental laws “fail to anticipate the possibility that certain government interests, particularly those of 
departments with major economic responsibilities, might diverge sharply from those of local environmental 
protection officers.  In such situations, local officials might be reluctant to impose serious sanctions even 
for major violations of environmental laws.”  Id. 
62  Economy, Environmental Enforcement, supra note 13, at 104. 
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government’s dictates, especially national environmental policies.63  These 
lower governments often have a stake in polluting industries,64 allowing 
local and provincial officials to benefit from lax enforcement.65  “China’s 
weak legal tradition . . . enables corruption to flourish.”66  Within the judicial 
system, the self-serving local influence continues; local judiciaries often are 
dependant on provincial and local governments for funding,67 and 
“[u]nsurprisingly, conflicts of interest frequently are resolved in favor of 
local officials’ priority on economic development.”68  Corruption typically 
results from “family, friendships, and other contacts and reciprocities,” and 
undermines all hope for evenhanded law enforcement.69 
III. CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM IS NOT PREPARED TO PROTECT CHINA’S 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES 
There are legal obstacles to protecting the environment in China.  
Both the existing legal system generally and its specific environmental 
                                                 
63  See Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14 (“local officials rarely heed Beijing’s environmental 
mandates”); Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 10, at 423-24; Economy, Environmental Enforcement, supra note 
13, at 104 (no “follow-through on central mandates to local levels”). 
64  See Adam Briggs, China’s Pollution Victims: Still Seeking a Dependable Remedy, 18 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 305, 316-17 (2006) (“any municipality’s worst polluter will often also be its largest 
employer and largest source of revenue”).  See also Economy, Environmental Enforcement, supra note 13, 
at 108. 
65  See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 118.  Interviews with local enforcement 
officials revealed that industries were difficult to fine or close down “because they are central to the health 
of the local economy.”  Id.  A representative example of the pressure of local influence can be seen in the 
case of Zhang Changjian et al. v. Rongping Chemical Plant, where a group of villagers filed a lawsuit 
against Asia’s largest producer of potassium chlorate.  See Wang, supra note 5, at 212-19 (providing a 
review and analysis of the case).  The plant was releasing pollutants that were negatively impacting 
villagers’ health and destroying timber stands, bamboo, fruit trees, and crops.  Id. at 213.  The plaintiffs 
were subject to great pressures as a result of the lawsuit; for instance, the lead plaintiff was assaulted while 
collecting water samples, and other plaintiffs were attacked physically and financially.  Id. at 215. 
66  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 92. 
67  Ruth Greenspan Bell, Culture and History Count: Choosing Environmental Tools to Fit Available 
Institutions and Experience, 38 IND. L. REV. 637, 645 (2005); Alford & Shen, supra note 61, at 416 
(“Subnational judicial salaries and court operating expenses come from subnational, rather than national, 
funds, leading some observers to question their capacity to maintain a high degree of independence from 
local officialdom.”).  Judges’ career advancement is also “frequently determined locally rather than 
nationally.”  Id.  “The local government controls both the personnel and the budget of the courts, making 
political intervention in the legal system a common problem.”  Economy, Environmental Enforcement, 
supra note 13, at 109. 
68  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 92. 
69  Professor Jerome Cohen, Keynote Address at the Vermont Law School Symposium: An 
Introduction to Law in China (Mar. 2, 2007), in 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. at 402.  As one example, in a lawsuit 
against a copper factory, the factory “was set up by the local government itself, had the head of the local 
trade commission as its chief executive, and would certainly be indemnified by the local government if the 
plaintiffs’ case was a success . . . .  Any local judge weighing evidence and deliberating the 
outcome . . . would realize that his own salary was tied to his decision.  This realization would make bias or 
the appearance of bias unavoidable.”  Briggs, supra note 64, at 330. 
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regulatory framework prevent adequate protection of the country’s 
ecosystems.  The government has an essentially non-existent enforcement 
mechanism, a weak judicial branch, and vague environmental laws.  Each of 
these factors contributes to China’s inability to protect its environmental 
resources and human health. 
A. China Has Numerous Environmental Laws, but They Have Not 
Effectively Addressed the Country’s Environmental Challenges 
Historically, environmental protection was considered the purview of 
the Emperor and his officials; and so individual citizens had little 
responsibility and took little action to protect the environment.70  Under that 
regime, the extent of protection afforded land and water resources depended 
on how responsibly individual officials executed their duty to protect the 
natural world.71 
In 1978, China, recognizing the need for environmental protection, 
amended the Chinese Constitution by inserting provisions that require the 
state to protect the environment and natural resources as well as prevent 
pollution and other public hazards.72  Presently, the Chinese Constitution 
prohibits damage to natural resources73 and places a duty on the State to 
protect the environment.74  However, these constitutional rights are not 
directly enforceable by the judiciary unless statutes clearly direct the courts 
to apply a particular right.75 
Environmental laws abound in China.  The National People’s 
Congress (“NPC”) has enacted roughly twenty statutes “primarily 
addressing pollution control, natural resource conservation, and product 
stewardship.”76  In addition to these statutes, China has extensive 
                                                 
70  See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 56. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. at 95-96. 
73  XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 9, § 2 (1982) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C) 
[hereinafter XIAN FA]. 
74  XIAN FA art. 26.  The Constitution also provides citizens the “right to criticize” and the “right to 
make complaints . . . for violations of law,” both of which should be used to raise awareness of 
environmental and natural resource damage.  XIAN FA, art. 41, § 1; see also Xioping Chen, The Difficult 
Road for Rights Advocacy An Unpredictable Future for the Development of Law in China, 16 TRANSNAT’L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2006). 
75  Ji Li, When Are There More Laws? When Do They Matter? Using Game Theory to Compare 
Laws, Power Distribution, and Legal Environments in the United States and China, 16 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 335, 340 (2007).  But see M. Ulric Killion, Post-WTO China and Independent Judicial Review, 26 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 507, 553-56 (2004) (discussing action by the Supreme People’s Court that arguably 
establishes the Court’s ability to interpret and directly apply the Constitution); Chris Lin, A Quiet 
Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 255, 270-74 (2003). 
76  Ferris & Zhang, supra note 5, at 583-84.  These laws include:  The Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law, The Clean Production Promotion Law, The Law on Desertification Prevention, The 
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administrative regulations.77  While China has successfully passed a plethora 
of environmental laws, policies, and regulations, these have not been 
implemented.78  According to one of China's top environmental lawyers, 
“barely ten percent of China's environmental laws and regulations are 
actually enforced.”79  The failure of China’s extensive environmental regime 
is likely a result of weak legal institutions.80 
Another factor contributing to the failure of a seemingly 
comprehensive scheme is the vague language of the laws.81  The laws are 
drafted in such a manner that, even if local governments were to attempt 
enforcement, the laws can be interpreted with extreme lenity.  Some have 
speculated that these laws are intentionally vague, designed to symbolize 
China’s desire to correct the country’s environmental problems, while 
maintaining the status quo in economic development.82  Thus, the laws 
function more like policy statements.83 
China’s environmental laws provide the tools for non-governmental 
enforcement through a private right of action.  The Environmental Protection 
Law,84 China’s general environmental statute, places liability on polluters.85  
                                                                                                                                               
Environmental Impact Assessment Law, The Energy Conservation Law, The Environmental Noise 
Pollution Law, The Fisheries Law, The Flood Prevention Law, The Forestry Law, The Grasslands Law, 
The Land Administration Law, The Law on the Prevention of Environmental Pollution Caused by Solid 
Waste, The Marine Environmental Protection Law, The Mineral Resource Law, The Water and Soil 
Conservation Law, The Water Law, The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law, and The Wildlife 
Protection Law.  Id. 
77  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 101.  By 2001, China had passed more than 
123 administrative regulations.  Economy also explains that these laws are complemented by more than 20 
technical environmental regulations issued by the State Council, 100 environmental rules and methods, and 
more than 300 standards formulated by SEPA and other State Council ministries and agencies.  Id. 
78  Benjamin J. Richardson, Is East Asia Industrializing Too Quickly? Environmental Regulation in 
Its Special Economic Zones, 22 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 150, 153-154 (2004).  One issue that contributes to 
this implementation problem is that “legislative documents often contain ambiguities, irreconcilable 
provisions and indefinite standards.”  Yuhong Zhao, supra note 52, at 174. 
79  Economy, The Great Leap, supra note 14. 
80  Richardson, supra note 78, at 153-54. 
81  Yuhong Zhao, supra note 52, at 174. 
82  See Briggs, supra note 64, at 312-13.  For a non-environmental example, see XiXin Wang, Suing 
the Sovereign Observed from the Chinese Perspective: The Idea and Practice of State Compensation in 
China, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 681, 689 (2003) (“ . . . the current state compensation system also 
reveals the hesitation and anxiety of the government, as evident in the substantial limits of individuals' right 
to state compensation . . . .  If we agree that the state compensation system must go beyond mere 
symbolism, those problems that are plaguing this system both in theory and in practice must be treated 
seriously”). 
83  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 101.  William Alford, a China legal expert, 
remarked that “China’s environmental laws are like policy statements rather than laws in the Western 
sense.”  Id. 
84  The Environmental Protection Law is the “cardinal law for environmental protection in China.”  
Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, and Pollution 
Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 267, 294 (2007) (quoting a 
1996 State Council Report).  The Environmental Protection Law establishes the national and local 
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A polluter will be liable for damages caused by its actions despite 
compliance with state standards; this is known as no-fault liability.86 In 
addition, the burden of proof is placed on defendants in court proceedings; 
the polluter is forced to prove that its actions did not cause the damages at 
issue.87  Each of these requirements should promote successful citizen suits. 
are more likely to be successful when a polluter is liable despite apparent 
compliance with state standards, because the polluter is forced forcing a 
polluter to prove that it did not cause the damage at issue. 
Unfortunately, many observe that China’s court system remains 
weak.88  In addition, the nation has not traditionally had a culture of utilizing 
lawyers, courts, or the law in general to resolve disputes;89 therefore, few 
will resort to court action on environmental matters.90  As a result, the 
existing court system is woefully inadequate to remedy the spiraling 
deterioration of China’s ecological systems. 
B.  The Overall Design of the Chinese Legal System Prevents Adequate 
Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
China is essentially a one-party government,91 controlled by the 
CPC.92  The PRC, as a socialist state, centers its government in people’s 
congresses, which are responsible for creating and supervising all 
                                                                                                                                               
environmental protection bureaus, contains specific provisions for the management and supervision of the 
environment, pollution control, and legal liability associated with pollution, and requires that provincial 
governments evaluate the environmental impact of their activities.  Id. 
85  Environmental Protection Law art. 41 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, Dec. 26, 
1989, effective on date of promulgation) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.) (“A unit that 
has caused environmental pollution hazard shall have the obligation to eliminate it & make compensation 
to the unit or individual that has suffered direct losses.”). 
86  Yuhong Zhao, supra note 52, at 178-79. 
87  Wang, supra note 5, at 209 (citing Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in 
Civil Procedures, a document released by the Supreme People’s Courts).  One statutory example of the 
burden of proof states, “[f]or a damage suit arising from the environmental pollution by solid wastes, the 
inflictor shall assume the burden of proof for the statutory exemption and the nonexistence of causation 
between its acts and harmful consequences.”  Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental 
Pollution by Solid Wastes art. 86 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, Dec. 29, 2004, 
effective Apr. 1, 2005), LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
88  Wang, supra note 5, at 202. 
89  Id. 
90   For instance, “[o]nly 9% of people will negotiate with the polluter directly, and only 2% [of] 
people will sue to the court . . . .”  Professor Li Zhiping, Address at the Vermont Law School Symposium: 
Environmental Challenges Facing Rural Areas in the Process of Industrialization (March 2, 2007), in 8 VT. 
J. ENVTL. L. at 426.  Professor Li Zhiping’s speech provides more information on the survey, particularly 
the specifics of how the survey was completed.  Id. at 426-27.  The survey was conducted by about thirteen 
students in his environmental law clinic and environmental law classes, over a period of four months, 
through interviews and questionnaires.  Id. 
91  See XIAN FA Preamble (“Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China . . . ”). 
92  See JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT & TRANSFORMATION 106-07 (2008). 
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administrative, judicial, prosecutorial, and military agencies of the state.93  
The NPC is the highest “organ” of state power,94 exercising legislative 
authority at the central level.95  The Constitution also empowers a smaller 
body,96 the Standing Committee of the NPC, with essentially the same 
authority as the NPC.97 
The directives of the NPC and the Standing Committee are executed 
by the State Council and its agencies.98  The State Council is comprised of 
various departments, commissions, administrations, and offices.99  The same 
legislative and administrative bodies exist at each level of government.  The 
top-down structure provides for little oversight and thus prevents proper 
enforcement of environmental laws because prevalent regional protectionism 
creates a tendency for local governments to disregard central government 
rules and regulations.100 
The judicial branch consists of both courts and procuratorates.101  The 
courts’ structure, divided into four levels, mirrors the top-down hierarchy of 
the State Council.102  China’s judiciary is quite decentralized, with control of 
the lower courts’ personnel and budget resting in local governments.103  
                                                 
93  See Wang Chenguang, supra note 49, at 15.  There are essentially five levels of government:   
1) central, 2) provincial, 3) prefectural (which includes large cities and autonomous regions), 4) county and 
city, and 5) township/village.  Id. at 16. 
94  XIAN FA art. 57.  See JIANFU CHEN, supra note 92, at 113.  The NPC convenes once a year, and is 
composed of almost 3000 deputies.  CHINA: OUTLINES OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 43, 45 (Zhang Fusen & Hu Zejun, eds., 2004). 
95  A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PRC 3 (Chris Hunter et al., eds., 1997). 
96  The Standing Committee is composed of less than 200 members.  JIANFU CHEN, supra note 92, at 
117. 
97  The Standing Committee is, among other things, empowered to interpret the Constitution and 
supervise its implementation; to make, revise, and interpret most statutes; and to supervise the State 
Council and other government bodies.  See XIAN FA art. 67. 
98  JIANFU CHEN, supra note 92, at 119.  The State Council is elected by the NPC.  A GUIDE TO THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PRC, supra note 95, at 4.  Although the Constitution theoretically vests all state 
power in the NPC and its Standing Committee, the State Council seems to be much more powerful than one 
would suspect.  JIANFU CHEN, supra note 92, at 119. 
99  See A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PRC, supra note 95, at 5. 
100  Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 10, at 424. 
101  The Chinese procuratorate is not only responsible for prosecutions but is also responsible for “the 
supervision of law” and supervision of important State departments.  Ye Feng, The Chinese Procuratorate 
and the Anti-Corruption Campaigns in the People’s Republic of China, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Jianfu Chen, Yuwen Li, & Jan Michiel Otto, eds., 2002).  The people’s 
procuratorates are the “state organs for legal supervision.”  XIAN FA art. 129.  The procuratorate system has 
an organizational structure similar to the court system.  See A Brief Introduction to China, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/Legal/index.asp. 
102  ZOU KEYUAN, CHINESE LEGAL REFORM: TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 144 (2006).  The levels are:  
1) The Supreme People’s Court, 2) the Higher People’s Courts, 3) the Intermediate People’s Courts, and  
4) the Basic People’s Courts.  Id.  To give an idea, there are more than 2200 county courts across the 
country; there are intermediate courts in every major city; and at the provincial level there are 32 high 
courts.  XiXin Wang, supra note 82, at 682. 
103  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 112. 
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Traditionally, judges were often military officers or merely demobilized 
soldiers or other civil servants; these individuals often had only a high 
school education and had no legal training or practice.104  While there is an 
ongoing effort to move away from this system, judges still often lack legal 
education and training.105  This lack of legal competence is problematic 
because China’s environmental laws and environmental issues are often 
complicated. 
For China’s legal system to effectively control environmental damage, 
it is imperative that the judicial system diligently sustain environmental laws 
and rights.  “No matter how perfect the environmental law is and how 
propitious the provisions are to defend the environmental rights and 
interests, the environmental law is meaningless if lawyers and judges have 
no knowledge of the particularity of environmental law.”106  One 
organization stated that “[w]hile environmental law is a burgeoning field of 
study, few judges, lawyers or environmental officials have received formal 
training.  Consequently, environmental cases are difficult to handle.  Lack of 
knowledge of the law affects pollution victims’ ability to get fair, timely 
redress.”107  Potential problems that arise as a result of a judiciary without 
expertise in environmental law include succumbing to local influence, 
failing to recognize an environmental pollution case, or misplacing the 
burden of proving causation. 
One water pollution case highlights the corrupting effect that local 
pressures can have on the legal system.  The plaintiffs’ mango crops were 
diseased as a result of dust and smog pollution from two nearby cement 
plants.108  After the plaintiffs prevailed in the first trial, the defendants 
inspired government and CPC party officials to get involved.109  The 
resulting report by the government and party officials suggested that the first 
                                                 
104  Id. at 113. 
105  Alford & Shen, supra note 61, at 417. 
106  Hu Jing, Case of Water Pollution Damage in Dexing City of Jiangxi Province, at 10, CLAPV Case 
Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA.  CLAPV stands for the Center for Legal 
Assistance to Pollution Victims. 
107  Xu Kezhu, Training Strengthens Environmental Law in China, CLAPV Media Reports, Jan. 5, 
2008, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=MR.  In order to combat this lack of understanding 
and formal training, CLAPV provides annual training sessions in environmental law to increase judges’, 
practitioners’, and officials’ practical and theoretical understanding of environmental law.  See id.  Lecture 
topics included current environmental legislation, handling complicated issues in environmental tort 
litigation, rules of evidence in civil cases, handling environmental disputes, application of environmental 
standards in litigation, and implementation of environmental law in China.  Id. 
108  Xu Kezhu, Case of Air Pollution Damage by Cement Plants in Yulin City of Guangxi Province, at 
1-3, CLAPV Case Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA. 
109  Id. at 7. 
170 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 18 NO. 1 
 
judge had incorrectly decided the case for a variety of reasons.110  A retrial 
was granted, and a panel determined that the plaintiffs’ evidence was too 
general and that there was no direct evidence of pollution damages.111  Local 
economic influences were able to manipulate the court’s lack of awareness 
and comprehension of environmental laws.  Confusion among the courts and 
judges will not result in constructive case decisions. 
In another lawsuit, tendencies to protect local factories could not 
influence the court, because the impacted, polluting enterprises were in a 
different county from the court.112  Upstream factories dumped numerous 
pollutants into a river, resulting in downstream duck and fish farmers losing 
significant portions of their stocks.113  The plaintiffs brought suit after 
government negotiations failed.114  The plaintiff farmers initiated suit in their 
home county, where the injuries occurred.115  The defendants attempted to 
have the case moved to the court in the defendant’s county, but the court 
refused.116  While the plaintiffs in this case benefited from being before the 
local court,117 there are many other instances where the desire to protect 
local industries works against the plaintiff, especially when the polluting 
defendant resides in the same county as the court.118 
A recent case highlights the failure of one court to recognize novel 
environmental pollution cases.  In LiFaJun v. Suzuki Car Company Ltd., a 
widower, Mr. Zhu, uncovered evidence that his wife may have died as a 
                                                 
110  Id. at 7-8. 
111  Id. at 8-9. 
112  See Wang Canfa, Water Pollution Damages Case in Pizhou, Jiangsu Province, at 1, CLAPV Case 
Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA (describing how pollution from the upper 
reaches of the Fang Ting River, which begins in Tongshan County, reached the lower reaches of the river, 
including portions in Pizhou City). Pizhou City is a different county-level city than Tongshan County, 
although both are under the jurisdiction of Xuzhou in Jiangsu Province.  See Cities and Towns, 
http://www.jiangsu.net/city/. 
113  Wang Canfa, supra note 112, at 4-5. 
114  See id. at 1-4, 4. 
115  See id. at 5. 
116  Id. at 5. 
117  Another factor weighing in the plaintiffs’ favor in this instance was the provision of free legal 
resources that the plaintiffs received. 
118  One prominent environmental lawyer explained that “[i]n all of the suits that we have lost, the 
courts have not followed the law.  Instead they ignored the legal or technical merits of our case in order to 
support the local enterprises.”  Ted Plafker, Nascent “Green Culture” is Challenging Authorities—and 
Being Heard: Chinese Activists Take to the Courts, INT’L HERALD TRIB., August 28, 2002, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/08/28/rbeijing_ed3_.php?pass=true.  It is difficult to obtain information 
on Chinese cases because many of them are not published and when they are they are not available in 
English translations.  When organizations, such as CLAPV, produce information about environmental 
cases, it is usually to laud the rare victory. 
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result of benzene poisoning.119  Shortly after purchasing a new car, Mrs. Zhu 
passed away; subsequently the benzene level in the car’s interior was tested 
and found to exceed the indoor air quality standard.120  Mr. Zhu sued Suzuki, 
the car manufacturer, because he believed that a flaw in their product 
resulted in Mrs. Zhu’s death.121  The court rejected the lawsuit on the 
grounds that Mr. Zhu had not provided adequate evidence of causation that 
the benzene levels resulted in Mrs. Zhu’s death.122  If the lawsuit had been 
brought under the Environmental Protection Law, Mr. Zhu would not have 
had the burden of proving causation; the burden would have been placed on 
the car manufacturer to show that the high levels of benzene in the car did 
not cause Mrs. Zhu’s death.123  The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution 
Victims in China (“CLAPV”) agreed to assist Mr. Zhu in his appeal after 
professors affiliated with CLAPV “determined that this was a unique type of 
environmental pollution case and that the first court had erred in its exercise 
of the law.”124  On appeal, Mr. Zhu’s attorneys framed the case as an 
environmental pollution case, but the higher court still rejected the claim.125  
If the courts had recognized that benzene was an air pollutant and that cases 
regarding potential injuries resulting from that pollutant should be tried 
under the EPL,126 the outcome for Mr. Zhu would likely have been very 
different.  Lawsuits based on environmental torts are a relatively recent 
phenomenon; courts must be able and willing to recognize and 
accommodate cases involving environmental pollution. 
As discussed above, Chinese environmental laws shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant.127  In general, a plaintiff in a tort case would be 
required to prove that a defendant’s actions had caused the alleged harm.  In 
                                                 
119  CLAPV, LiFaJun v. Suzuki Car Company Ltd., CLAPV Legal Aid Cases, July 11, 2008, 
http://www.clapv.org/new/show_en.php?id=89&catename=LAC [hereinafter LiFaJun v. Suzuki Car 
Company]. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  In the United States, indoor air pollution is regulated and monitored by the Environmental 
Protection Agency.  See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Indoor Air Quality Homepage, 
http://www.epa.gov/iaq/index.html.  
127  Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures art. 4, states:  
“The burden of proof in the tort actions shall be assumed according to the following rules . . . .  In a 
compensation lawsuit for damages caused by environmental pollution, the infringing party shall be 
responsible for producing evidence to prove the existence of exemptions of liabilities as provided in laws or 
that there is no causal relationship between his act and the harmful consequences . . . .”  Some Provisions of 
the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures art. 4 (promulgated by the Supreme People’s 
Court, Dec. 21, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
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environmental tort cases, once the plaintiff shows injury and some contact 
with the defendant, the defendant has to prove that the plaintiff’s injuries 
were caused by something else besides the defendant’s actions.  This 
inversion of the burden of proof is extremely beneficial when employed.  
Often, however, a court does not understand that the burden of proof must be 
shifted or does not recognize that a case is an environmental tort deserving 
of the inversion.  In the cement plant case described above, the court 
attempted on retrial to place the burden of proof onto the plaintiff, instead of 
on the defendant where it belonged because the case was for damages from 
environmental pollution.128  The failure of courts to recognize that the 
burden of proof must be transferred to the defendant is especially 
problematic when the plaintiff does not know that the burden should be 
shifted either, so the plaintiff does not even present it as a possibility to the 
court.  In one case, the plaintiff failed to raise the burden of proof allocation 
because the plaintiff lacked knowledge of environmental court cases.129  The 
plaintiff, the Shuangxi Reservoir Management Bureau, stocked the reservoir 
with fish that were subsequently killed in large numbers by the release of 
machine oil from the generator room of the upstream Power Station.130  As 
one lawyer on the case stated, “[t]he undertaking judge is obviously ignorant 
of environmental law, due to which Inversion of Burden of Proof is not 
adopted in the court hearing.  It is urgent for judges and lawyers to take up 
universal knowledge of environmental law, independent branch of laws, with 
environmental torts taking place at an increasing rate.”131  Cases involving 
complex environmental laws and science would be more appropriately 
handled in a court experienced in such cases. 
C. A Specialized Court Would Not Provide All of the Answers To China’s 
Environmental Problems, But These Challenges Can Be Indirectly 
Addressed Through An Environmental Court 
While the solution to China’s failing environmental paradigm offered 
in this comment—developing a specialized court to hear environmental 
issues—would benefit China’s legal system and help the country face 
environmental challenges, the effectiveness of such a specialized court 
                                                 
128  Xu Kezhu, Case of Air Pollution Damage by Cement Plants in Yulin City of Guangxi Province, at 
8, CLAPV Case Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA. 
129  Hu Jing, Case of Water Pollution Damage in Dexing City of Jianxi Province, at 10, CLAPV Case 
Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA.  
130  Id. at 1-2. 
131  Hu Jing, Case of Water Pollution Damage in Dexing City of Jiangxi Province, at 10, CLAPV Case 
Analysis, http://www.clapv.org/new/cate_en.php?catename=CA. 
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should not be overstated.  There are areas of concern that a specialized court 
could only indirectly ameliorate.  China has grave environmental challenges 
that cannot easily be remedied.  In addition, other issues may compromise 
any gain in environmental protection that results from a specialized court, 
including non-enforcement,132 corruption,133 and the technical difficulty of 
correcting already existing problems.  In order for the specialized court to 
effectively function, citizens must be aware of this forum and be willing to 
utilize it.  It is encouraging to note that Chinese citizens are more frequently 
heading to court with the gravest pollution problems,134 but people must be 
willing to challenge less obvious, but nonetheless serious, pollution and 
natural resource destruction.  Ideally, providing a specialized forum will 
increase the use of litigation as a means of dispute resolution135 to challenge 
a variety of environmentally destructive activities.  However, without proper 
legal assistance, Chinese citizens may remain without adequate access to the 
judicial system.  Non-profit legal assistance will be an important contributor 
to the effective operation and legitimacy of an environmental court 
system.136 
The legal road ahead for Chinese environmental activists promises to 
be difficult, but these difficulties and the potential for failure only 
underscore the importance of reform and should not prevent an attempt at 
stability and success.  A specialized court would benefit China’s legal system 
                                                 
132  An environmental court could not directly increase the level of enforcement.  Increased 
enforcement will result most directly from changing attitudes of government officials. 
133  Corruption can be addressed to some extent when the State brings charges against government 
officials.  The central Chinese government does realize the important of environmental enforcement and 
has attempted to address the problem of lax enforcement and corruption through laws and regulations.  In 
order to address dereliction of duty by government officials, the central government has produced the 
Provisional Measures on the Penalties for Violation of Law or Discipline in Environmental Protection, the 
Explanation on Certain Issues Relating to the Governing Law in the Criminal Trial for Environmental 
Pollution Cases by the Higher People’s Court, and the Higher People’s Procuratorate’s Standard for 
Indictment of Dereliction of Duty.  See Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 10 (translating the regulations). 
134  See Wang, supra note 5, at 204. 
135  The number of environmental disputes increases every year.  Wang Canfa, Keynote Address at the 
Vermont Law School Symposium: Special Functions of Promoting Public Participation in Environmental 
Protection in Aiding Pollution Victims (March 2, 2007), in China in Transition: Environmental Challenges 
in the Far East, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. at 384-85.  “[E]very year there’s at least 20% to 30% increase in 
environmental complaints” submitted to environmental authorities.  Id. 
136  See Wang, supra note 5, at 204-05.  Many argue for NGO standing to sue in environmental 
pollution cases.  See Patti Goldman, Panel Address at the Vermont Law School Symposium: The 
International Silk Road: Engaging Domestic Efforts to Protect China’s Environment (March 2, 2007), in 
China in Transition: Environmental Challenges in the Far East, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. at 448-49; see also 
Orts, supra note 12, at 562-64.  See generally Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in 
China: Lessons Learned From the U.S. Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251 (2007).  This would greatly 
increase the likelihood that cases would be heard by a specialized environmental tribunal. 
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and would begin to resolve many of the problems responsible for 
environmental degradation. 
IV. CHINA SHOULD USE THE MODELS OF EXISTING SPECIALIZED COURTS 
TO GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL COURT 
China should adopt a specialized court system in order to address the 
complicated legal issues presented by environmental litigation.  Both the 
New Zealand Environmental Court (“NZEC”) and China’s maritime courts 
could provide models for the development of an environmental court in 
China.  Environmental and maritime issues are both very complicated areas 
of law, which benefit from having knowledgeable judicial officials resolve 
issues.  The NZEC is a specialized tribunal that addresses environmental and 
natural resources issues and disputes in New Zealand.  Similarly, the 
maritime courts in China have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve maritime and 
admiralty disputes. 
A.  New Zealand’s Environment Court Offers a Solution for Managing 
Environmental Disputes 
New Zealand is at the forefront of developing specialized 
environmental jurisprudence.137  It has benefited from the use of a special 
tribunal to review planning decisions since 1953, when the Town and 
Country Planning Appeal Board was created.138  In 1991, the country merged 
statutory planning and environmental controls into one comprehensive law:  
the Resource Management Act (“RMA”).139  The RMA is New Zealand’s 
primary environmental statute,140 and “[t]here are few aspects of the 
management of the air, land and water that are not within its purview.”141  In 
                                                 
137  “A specialised adjudicative tribunal . . . is a rarity in the world of environmental law . . . .  Apart 
from New South Wales, Australia, and the Planning Board Tribunals in the United Kingdom . . . [there are 
no] other specialised tribunals with the status of courts of law that are particularly focussed on resolving 
environmental disputes.”  Bret Birdsong, Adjudicating Sustainability: New Zealand’s Environment Court 
and the Resource Management Act 1, Ian Axford (New Zealand) Fellowship in Public Policy (Oct. 1998), 
available at http://www.fulbright.org.nz/voices/axford/docs/birdsongb.pdf [hereinafter Birdsong 1998]. 
138  The Planning Appeal Board and its successors provided the basis for the current Environmental 
Court.  Trevor Daya-Winterbottom, Evolving Practice—the Environment Court of New Zealand, 13 ENVTL 
LIABILITY 119, 119-20 (2005). 
139  Resource Management Act, 1991, No. 69 (N.Z.), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1991/0069/latest/DLM230265.html [hereinafter RMA]. 
140  David Grinlinton, Access to Environmental Justice in New Zealand, 1999 ACTA JURIDICA 80, 80 
(1999). 
141  Id. at 80.  There are, however, “a number of areas of environmental law [that] remain outside the 
Act.”  Id. 
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1996, amendments to the RMA created the Environment Court.142  This 
institution was an important addition to the RMA.  One scholar notes that 
“[the Environment Court] can be said to serve as judge, jury, and 
executioner over most of the fundamental aspects of the RMA regime.”143  
The NZEC is an expert tribunal that primarily addresses public interest 
questions related to resource management and environmental law.144 
The establishment of the NZEC is generally accepted as a “notable 
success.”145  One former Environment Court judge concluded that “the 
[NZEC] has established a practice of open and patient hearings, and 
reasoned decisions that have normative value for primary decision-makers 
and professional advisers.”146  Overall, the NZEC plays an important role in 
protecting the country’s public resources and the public interest under the 
RMA.147 
B.  Chinese Specialized Courts Address Complicated and Important 
Subjects in Ways that Can Inform the Creation of a Chinese 
Environmental Court 
Specialized courts are authorized under the provisions of China’s Law 
on the Organization of the People’s Courts of the People's Republic of China 
(“Organization Law”).148  Article 2 of the 1979 Organization Law stipulates 
that “the trial power of the People’s Republic of China is exercised by the 
following people's courts:  (1) local people’s courts at various levels; (2) 
specialized people’s courts; [and] (3) the Supreme People’s Court . . . .  
Specialized people’s courts include:  military courts, railway transport 
courts, maritime transport courts, forestry courts and other specialized 
courts.”149 
Currently, China has specialized courts for each of these areas of 
law,150 as well as a specialized court for patent, copyright, and trademark 
                                                 
142  RMA, Part 11, §§ 247-308, and Part 12, §§ 309-343D, are the provisions that detail the specifics 
of the Environment Court.  
143  Birdsong 1998, supra note 137, at 1. 
144  Daya-Winterbottom, supra note 138, at 121. 
145  Id. at 120. 
146  Id. 
147  Stephen Higgs, Mediating Sustainability, 37 ENVTL. L. 61, 80 (2007). 
148  See Curtis Pew, Robert Jarvis, & Mark Sidel, Maritime Courts in the Middle Kingdom: China’s 
Great Leap Seaward, 11 MAR. LAW. 237, n.7 (1986).  The law was adopted in 1951.  Id. 
149  See id.; see also Organic Law of the People’s Courts (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the 
NPC, Sept. 2, 1983, effective on date of promulgation) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct 28, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
150  Mark Sidel, The Acceptance of Emerging American Law Abroad: Could ‘Maritime RICO’ Work 
in the People’s Republic of China, 12 TUL. MAR. L.J. 99, 105 (1987). 
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disputes.151  One scholar explains that the purpose of these courts is to 
provide a judicial body which is capable of handling specific, complex areas 
of the law.152  This same rationale suggests that a specialized environmental 
court would benefit both China’s environment and China’s judiciary, by 
raising the quality of judicial decision-making. 
China’s maritime courts serve as an instructive example of an 
effective specialized court whose structure and operation could be 
incorporated to develop an environmental court.153  China’s maritime courts 
system are a useful model because they have experience resolving complex 
disputes and they demonstrate the type of judicial institution that would be 
acceptable to the Chinese government. 
V. A SPECIALIZED ENVIRONMENTAL COURT WOULD SUIT CHINA’S 
CURRENT LEGAL SYSTEM  
The Chinese government should exploit its ability to develop 
specialized courts under Chinese law and create a court dedicated to 
overseeing environmental and natural resource disputes.  In developing an 
environmental court, China should consider the examples that the NZEC and 
the Chinese maritime courts offer.154  The Chinese Environmental Courts’ 
structure, authority, jurisdiction, and standing requirements should be 
developed through modification of New Zealand’s Environment Court and 
China’s maritime courts. 
A.  The Structure of the NZEC and the Maritime Courts Should Be Used 
as a Model for the Creation of a Chinese Environmental Court 
The NZEC is not a very large judicial body; it is currently composed 
of seven Judges, three Alternate Judges, fifteen Commissioners, and six 
                                                 
151  See Ryan Goldstein et. al., Specialized IP Trial Courts Around the World, 18 No. 10 INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. L. J. 1 (Oct. 2006).  These courts were created in 1993.  Id. 
152  Mark Hamilton, Sailing in a Sea of Obscurity: The Growing Importance or China’s Maritime 
Arbitration Commission, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 477, 505-06 (2002).  “[J]udges have developed 
technical and legal expertise from repeated exposure to . . . cases and experience interpreting . . . law.  This 
enables . . . judges to resolve disputes quickly and efficiently.”  Id. at 505. 
153  Maritime courts were established by the NPC Standing Committee in 1984 with the Decision of 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Establishment of Maritime Courts in 
Coastal Port Cities.  Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 241. 
154  Of course, “any recommendations coming from an outside Western observer must be careful to 
take into account the unique legal, political, and cultural situation of Chinese society.  Direct ‘transplants’ 
of Western environmental laws are unlikely to take root very easily, if at all . . . .  Environmental solutions 
for China should focus instead on building the basic institutional infrastructure and capacities needed for an 
effective and efficient administrative legal system . . . .”  Orts, supra note 12, at 546. 
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Deputy Commissioners.155  The Environmental Judges are ordinary judges 
who are appointed for life, while the Environmental Commissioners are 
experts who are appointed for five year terms.156  The commissioners are 
technically-oriented laypersons157 who work alongside judges, preside over 
hearings, and assist in writing judicial decisions.158  The commissioners are 
not required to have legal training159 because they are appointed to ensure 
that the NZEC “possesses a mix of knowledge and experience” in relevant 
matters.160  Hearings are generally open to the public and are relatively 
informal, as the court is not bound by the country’s rules of evidence.161 
China’s maritime courts have a different structure than the NZEC.  
There are multiple maritime courts, located all along China’s coast.162  The 
maritime courts are trial-level courts only,163 with appeals managed by the 
relevant provincial Supreme Courts.164  The individual maritime courts are 
divided into different offices, with two different trial divisions.  One trial 
section handles admiralty cases, while the other manages maritime 
commerce issues.165  Each court also has a research office and a court 
administration office.166  There is a court president who oversees every 
office, while each trial division additionally has its own president.167  Many 
of the maritime courts’ judges have formal training in maritime law.168  
                                                 
155  Environment Court of New Zealand, http://www.justice.govt.nz/environment/home.asp (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2008).  “A quorum for the court is one judge and one commissioner, but hearings can also 
be held with one judge and two commissioners or, more rarely, a judge or commissioner sitting alone.”  
Higgs, supra note 147, at 75. 
156  Bret Birdsong, Adjudicating Sustainability: New Zealand’s Environment Court, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
1, 32-33 (May 2002) [hereinafter Birdsong 2002]. 
157  Id. at 4. 
158  See id. at 33.  The commissioners also oversee court mediation, which is a method of dispute 
resolution that is actively promoted by NZEC.  Id. 
159  Higgs, supra note 147, at 75. 
160  RMA § 253.  Desirable skills include expertise in business, economics, local government affairs, 
planning and resource management, environmental science, architecture and engineering, or techniques in 
alternative dispute resolution.  Higgs, supra note 147, at 75; see also RMA § 253; Environment Court of 
New Zealand, Mediation, http://www.justice.govt.nz/environment/procedure/mediation.asp (last visited 
April 18, 2008) (“Experience in alternative dispute resolution is one of the criteria for eligibility for 
appointment as an Environment Commissioner.”). 
161  Higgs, supra note 147, at 75.  There are three courthouses where hearings take place, but, as a 
circuit court, it also will travel to hold hearings near the locality of the subject matter in dispute.  Id. 
162  Peter Murray, China: An Emerging Jurisdiction, in JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW 119-135, 119 (Martin Davies ed., 2005).  Originally there were five 
maritime courts established, but currently there are ten maritime courts and twenty-seven branch courts.  Id. 
163  The maritime courts have the same status as intermediate courts in the Chinese legal system.  K.X. 
LI & C.W.M. INGRAM, MARITIME LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA 22 (2002). 
164  Id. at 22-23. 
165  Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 242. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
168  Murray, supra note 162, at 122. 
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Within the maritime court system there is also a powerful arbitration body.  
The maritime judges are empowered to compel and oversee maritime 
arbitrations.169 
Drawing from each of these examples, China can develop a court akin 
to the NZEC that fits within China’s existing legal regime.  The concept of 
using technically-oriented laypersons accords with the Chinese tradition of 
laypersons’ participation in judicial decision-making, and could even 
improve the quality of decision-making by requiring technical expertise.170  
By adopting a preference for judges who have some relevant knowledge or 
experience in addition to legal comprehension, China would focus its 
environmental talent on environmental needs and develop a knowledgeable 
judiciary. 
The NZEC’s small size makes direct implementation of a similar 
structure in China impossible.  China’s large geographical and political size 
would require multiple specialized courts spread across the country.  Like 
the maritime courts, the environment courts could be located without 
reference to the smaller political boundaries that the general courts follow.  
The maritime courts are located in relevant areas:  port cities.171  Similarly, 
the environment courts should be located in areas of particular 
environmental importance and concern.  The country’s immensity generates 
numerous areas that would benefit from a specialized court.  For example, 
courts could be located in larger cities—such as Beijing—that have rampant 
air pollution, in cities in the Northern provinces where desertification is 
quickly conquering the land, and near major waterways where water quality 
issues arise often. 
Such specialized courts would accept the responsibility of overseeing 
both trial and appellate cases.  The basic structure of the Chinese 
Environmental Court would have to follow the general structure of all 
Chinese courts, which are internally divided into various substantive and 
                                                 
169  Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 243. 
170  Historically, judges in the people’s courts were not required to hold law degrees.  China has 
recently strengthened the qualification requirements to be a judge, so that the level of education required is 
a bachelor’s degree in law or a bachelor’s degree in some other subject combined with knowledge of law.  
See Judges Law ch. 4 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, June 30, 2001, effective July, 1, 
1995) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.) (amending the 1995 Judge’s Law); see also 
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 291 (2002).  Thus, people with 
relevant environmental knowledge and training could become judges by gathering legal knowledge in their 
other studies.  Id. 
171  See Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Establishment 
of Maritime Courts in Coastal Port Cities (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, Nov. 14, 1984, 
effective on date of promulgation) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.); see also Pew, 
Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 241. 
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administrative divisions.172  Adhering to the structure of all Chinese courts, 
the environmental court would be divided up by different substantive 
divisions, including an appellate division,173 a civil division,174 and a 
criminal division.175  The administrative divisions would include a research 
office, a supervision office, a planning and finance section, and a political 
department.176  Akin to both the NZEC and the maritime courts, a Chinese 
Environmental Court should have a mediation and arbitration section.  This 
is an important component of all dispute resolution in China, and it would 
likely increase the efficiency and use of an environmental court.177  That 
there are a large number of different divisions and sections of the court may 
raise concerns that the environmental court system would be quite large and 
unwieldy.  However, these various divisions are present in all Chinese 
courts; installing another unique court system with the same fundamental 
design should not prove especially difficult. 
B.  To Accommodate Traditional Chinese Understanding of the 
Judiciary’s Role, the Scope of the Chinese Environmental Court’s 
Authority Should be a Modified Version of the NZEC’s Authority 
In New Zealand, the Environment Court has the authority to hear all 
cases brought under the RMA and some issues regulated by other statutes 
related to environmental and planning issues.178  The NZEC exercises 
authority under the RMA in three realms.  First, it has the power to interpret 
the law through declarations.179  Second, it has the power to review de novo 
local government authorities’ decisions when those decisions are brought to 
                                                 
172  PEERENBOOM, supra note 170, at 283.  
173  The appellate division within the environmental court would simply hear appeals from 
administrative decisions.  Appeals from environmental court decisions would be brought before the 
Supreme Court in the relevant province, as maritime court appeals are brought.  See LI & INGRAM, supra 
note 163, at 22-23. 
174  The civil divisions could be divided into core environmental categories, such as water, air, and 
forests. 
175  While China’s maritime courts do not have jurisdiction over criminal cases, at least two of China’s 
other special courts—the military court and the railway and transport court—have jurisdiction over 
criminal cases.  Zhu Guobin, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 31, 61-62 (Wang 
Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997). 
176  See PEERENBOOM, supra note 170, at 284. 
177  For more on judicial mediation, see Yuhong Zhao, supra note 52. 
178  New Zealand Environment Court, How Cases Come to Court, 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/environment/about/how-cases-court.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).  The NZEC 
has jurisdiction over other statutes, including:  Historic Places Act, Forests Act, Local Government Act, 
Transit New Zealand Act, Electricity Act, Crown Minerals Act, Maori Commercial Aquaculture Claim 
Settlement Act, Biosecurity Act, and Public Works Act.  Id. 
179  RMA §§ 310-313; see also Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 28-30. 
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the NZEC by reference or appeal.180  Lastly, the NZEC has the authority to 
enforce the RMA’s requirements through civil or criminal proceedings.181 
The power to make declarations regarding “[t]he existence or extent 
of any function, power, right, or duty” under the RMA is a powerful tool.182  
The Environment Court is empowered to engage in fairly “sweeping and 
intensive environmental policymaking.”183  When combined with the power 
to review decisions by regional and territorial authorities, this power of 
declaration allows the NZEC to review generally the policy statements and 
policy decisions of the various levels of government, excluding national 
policy statements.184  The NZEC has the authority to review other decisions 
of government authorities, such as decisions on applications for resource 
consents.185  The Court also can issue enforcement orders under the RMA,186 
and this ability is far-reaching and powerful.187 
The Chinese maritime courts’ authority is seemingly limited by the 
practical nature of the specialty area.  Their authority appears to be limited 
mainly to reviewing de novo disputes between various parties.188  These 
courts appear to handle contract disputes primarily,189 and do not delve into 
                                                 
180  See Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 28, 30-31. 
181  See id. at 28, 31-32. 
182  RMA § 310(a). 
183  See Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 39.  Environment Court decisions can be appealed to the 
High Court, but review by the High Court is limited to points of law.  The High Court itself recognizes that 
it lacks the expertise and background to address the matters of policy that drive environmental decision-
making in the Environment Court:  “[T]he role of this Court is not to delve into questions of planning and 
resource management.  That is for the expert [Environment Court] to determine based on its knowledge 
gained from its day-to-day experience and its consideration of district and regional plans and submissions 
made to it.”  Id. at 38 (citing Stark v. Auckland Reg’l Council, [1994] N.Z.R.M.A. 337, 340). 
184  See Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 29; Birdsong 1998, supra note 137, at 19-20.  Of the major 
policy statements, only the national policy statements are unreviewable by the Environment Court.  
Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 30. 
185  Id. at 30-31.  Applications for resource consents are essentially an application for land use, and a 
resource consent must be obtained for most development and other land use activities.  See Ministry for the 
Environment, Setting the Scene: Resource Consents, 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/everyday/consent-submission-jun06/html/page3.html (last visited 
April 17, 2008).  The NZEC is afforded de novo review of these proceedings.  See RMA § 276; see also 
Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 30-31. 
186  RMA §§ 314-321.  These enforcement orders may, among other things, 1) enjoin a person from 
acting in a manner that contravenes the RMA or other regulations, rules, or orders; 2) enjoin a person from 
acting in a manner that is likely to be objectionable or to have an adverse impact on the environment;  
3) require a person to act affirmatively to ensure compliance with the RMA or to avoid, remedy, or mitigate 
adverse effects on the environment; and 4) require a person to compensate others for the reasonable costs 
associated with avoiding, remedying, or mitigating adverse effects on the environment caused by that 
person.  RMA § 314.  There are many other actions the NZEC may require through enforcement actions.  
See id. 
187  Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 32. 
188  See generally Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at appendices. 
189  See id. at 245-50 (three of the four cases that the authors describe are contract disputes, the fourth 
is seemingly a tort issue involving financial injury from an anchor severing an underwater electric cable); 
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policy or constitutional issues to resolve those disputes.  The maritime courts 
have the authority to embark on investigations of cases, including requesting 
evidence that the court believes is necessary for the determination of the 
action.190  The maritime courts also are granted the authority to issue 
injunctions; this power allows a maritime court to order someone to do or 
refrain from doing something in order to prevent infringement of the 
legitimate rights and interests of another.191 
Chinese courts of second instance can review lower courts’ decisions 
and administrative actions with the discretion to investigate and conduct a 
new hearing.192  Thus, one aspect of the NZEC and the maritime courts that 
should remain in effect in the Chinese Environment Court is the authority to 
review cases de novo.  Understanding the centralized nature of Chinese 
political decision-making, the court would not be granted the legal authority 
to make broad declarations of law.193  Furthermore, review cannot be granted 
over administrative decisions, as such review is precluded by China’s 
Administrative Procedure Law.194  
                                                                                                                                               
see generally Detailed Regulations Governing Maritime Litigation Involving Foreigners art. III 
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Jan. 31, 1986, effective on date of promulgation) 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Maritime Litigation Involving Foreigners 
Regulations]. 
190  See Civil Procedure Law ch. 6 art. 64 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, Oct. 28, 
2007, effective Apr. 9, 1991) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Civil 
Procedure Law] (“For the evidence that cannot be obtained by any parties or their litigation representatives 
because of some realistic reasons or for the evidence that the people’s court considers necessary for 
adjudicating the case, the people’s court shall investigate and collect such evidence”); id. art. 65 (“The 
people’s court shall have the authority to obtain evidence from any relevant units or individuals, and such 
units or individuals may not refuse to provide evidence”).  Interestingly, the maritime courts also have the 
authority to arrest vessels, but this authority does not seem to have any importance in a specialized 
environmental court, as the factories that are polluting seem unlikely to just float away before the cases are 
decided.  See Pew, note 148, at 243-44, Appendix D at 266-71. 
191  LI & INGRAM, supra note 163, at 35. 
192  See A Brief Introduction to China, http://www.lawinfochina.com/Legal/index.asp (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2008) (“Cases of second instance are often reviewed de novo as to both law and facts.”); Civil 
Procedure Law ch. 14 art. 152 (establishing that people’s courts of second instance should verify the facts 
“by consulting the file, making necessary investigations, and questioning the parties”).  Having the 
authority to collect evidence is especially important in environmental pollution cases, because the plaintiffs 
do not often have the financial resources or knowledge to collect and analyze pollution samples. 
193  The Supreme People’s Court may in reality be able to exercise this type of authority regardless of 
the constitutional provision.  Since the NPC and the Standing Committee have not exercised their authority 
to construe the laws and enforce the Constitution, the Supreme People’s Court has been left free to interpret 
laws even in the absence of a lawsuit.  XIAN FA, art. 67; see also M. Ulric Killion, Post-WTO China and 
Independent Judicial Review, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 507, 530, 536 (2004). 
194  See Administrative Procedure Law ch. II, art. 12 (promulgated by the National People’s Congress, 
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.).  This law is also 
known as the Administrative Litigation Law.  The law prohibits courts from reviewing abstract 
administrative actions which have general applicability, restricting court review to “concrete administrative 
actions.”  Song Bing, Assessing China’s System of Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, 8 CHINA L. 
REP. 1 (1994-1999).  
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C.  The NZEC’s and the Maritime Courts’ Jurisdictional Reach Should Be 
the Model for a Chinese Environmental Court  
The NZEC is an expert tribunal that primarily addresses public 
interest questions related to resource management and environmental law.195  
The NZEC exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of the RMA and some 
aspects of other statutes.  It has the same status and powers in exercising its 
jurisdiction as a District Court,196 but is “not bound by the usual procedural 
and evidentiary formalities of other courts of law.”197  Rather, the 
Environment Court establishes its own rules of conduct and evidence.198 
China’s maritime courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any 
maritime matter.199  The rules for the maritime courts expressly designate the 
types of cases that the maritime courts are authorized to handle.200  The 
maritime courts are permitted to “hear appeals from maritime administrative 
decisions, fines, and rulings,”201 but do not have any jurisdiction over 
criminal proceedings.202  Interestingly, the maritime courts are granted 
express jurisdiction to hear cases involving marine pollution, such as 
discharge of oil or hazardous wastes.203  This overlap with a potential 
environmental court would have to be resolved by the NPC upon the 
creation of a specialized environmental court.  The maritime courts have 
international jurisdiction, in order to hear cases involving foreign parties or 
elements.204  Each court’s territorial jurisdiction is based on geographical 
location.205 
China’s specialized environmental courts should assume jurisdiction 
over questions of natural resource and environmental law.  Beyond that 
critical resemblance to the NZEC, however, the jurisdiction granted to 
                                                 
195  Daya-Winterbottom, supra note 138, at 121. 
196  RMA § 278. 
197  Birdsong 2002, supra note 156, at 28; see also RMA § 276(2). 
198  Birdsong 1998, supra note 137, at 18. 
199  LI & INGRAM, supra note 163, at 23. 
200  See Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Scope of Cases to be Entertained by 
Maritime Courts (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Sept. 11, 2001, effective Sept. 18, 2001) 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
201  Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 243. 
202  Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Establishment of 
Maritime Courts in Coastal Port Cities § 3 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the NPC, Nov. 14, 
1984, effective on date of promulgation) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
203  See Decision of the Supreme People’s Court with Respect to Certain Questions on the 
Establishment of Maritime Courts § 3(3) (P.R.C.), translated in Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 
258-59 (Appendix B) [hereinafter Supreme People’s Court, Maritime Courts]; see also Maritime Litigation 
Involving Foreigners Regulations art. III. 
204  LI & INGRAM, supra note 163, at 23. 
205  See Supreme People’s Court Decision, Establishment of Maritime Courts § 4 (P.R.C.), translated 
in Pew, Jarvis, & Sidel, supra note 148, at 259-60 (Appendix B). 
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China’s environmental courts would have to be modified.  While the NZEC 
has jurisdiction over all cases and controversies arising primarily under one 
statute, China’s environmental laws are not so consolidated.206  Either the 
Chinese specialized court should have express jurisdiction over the many 
specific environmental statutes and administrative regulations, or the types 
of disputes the court could hear should be specifically enumerated, much 
like China’s maritime courts.207 
To concentrate all environmental matters in one court, China’s 
environmental courts should be empowered to hear both civil and criminal 
cases.  While the maritime courts are not given authority to hear criminal 
cases, the NZEC does have such power.  Criminal jurisdiction would be 
necessary for a Chinese Environmental Court because it would force all 
disputes involving environmental issues to be heard by one court, which 
would provide consistency in decision-making and also would allow citizens 
to better understand the court’s purview.  Specifically, a Chinese 
Environmental Court should have authority to hear those cases the State 
brings against Chinese officials for failing to enforce environmental 
statutes.208  These types of cases are likely to involve complicated 
environmental statutes, and it would provide the court with the ability to 
oversee this critical aspect of environmental problems. 
D.  The Standing Requirements for the NZEC Should be Modified to 
Follow Chinese Law 
The standing requirements for a specialized court in China will 
necessarily have to be different than the NZEC’s very open standing rules.  
The RMA gives any person standing to sue who participated in a 
government decision.209  In China, public participation in the creation of 
                                                 
206  See supra note 76 for a long list of environmental laws through 2003. 
207  The second option would more likely prevent confusion and unnecessary statutory changes when 
new environmental laws are adopted, because the types of disputes, and not specific statutes, would qualify 
the cases that the environmental court would hear. 
208  As an example of a criminal case brought by the State against government officials, in 2002, “the 
director and vice director of a county-level EPB in Shanxi Province were sentenced to prison for six and 
eight months, respectively, for failing to stop a chemical plant from discharging toxic waste into the 
drinking water system of a local village.”  ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 114-15.  
Having these suits proceed in an environmentally focused tribunal may provide a greater incentive for 
officials to follow and enforce environmental laws. 
209  Participation merely means commenting on a potential rule, action, or other decision, such as 
making a submission to a council.  See Birdsong 1998, supra note 137, at 10.  In addition, a person has 
standing to sue if she or he is affected by the decision or represents some relevant aspect of the public 
interest.  Id.  Also, any person may request that the NZEC initiate proceedings regarding a criminal offense 
committed under the RMA.  Id. 
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rules and regulations is extremely limited.210  The standing requirements in a 
Chinese specialized environmental court must comply with Chinese law.  
Only those individual citizens or organizations whose legal rights and 
interest have been directly affected by another’s activities have standing to 
bring a lawsuit.211 
In sum, a Chinese Environment Court would share much in common 
with the NZEC.  Like the NZEC it would have jurisdiction over all 
environmental matters and it would have a similar structure to the NZEC.  
But a specialized court would need to fit within the existing Chinese legal 
system; it would therefore differ from the NZEC in its standing requirements 
and it would have more limited authority than the NZEC.  Overall, these 
proposed aspects of a Chinese Environment Court would create a tribunal 
addressing environmental matters, which are often complicated and 
contentious.  A specialized court would provide a forum for Chinese citizens 
to redress injuries to their health and environment.  While it is daunting to 
fashion a specialized court for an issue of such importance, it is possible to 
learn from what has been done already and use that knowledge to create a 
unique and successful institution. 
VI. A SPECIALIZED ENVIRONMENTAL COURT WOULD PROMOTE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN CHINA 
Specialized courts create experts in a specific field, and allow for 
consistency and uniformity in decisions.  Each of these benefits could help 
stabilize the Chinese legal system and promote investment in China’s 
economy.  One commentator concluded that the use of a specialized and 
expert tribunal increases public confidence in that court’s determinations; 
improves efficiency of environmental litigation, particularly because 
“[r]elatively less time (and expense) is necessary to reliably inform the Court 
about the issues it is adjudicating”; and contributes to environmentally sound 
decision-making.212  Another scholar found that specialization increases 
expertise, which is beneficial because expertise provides more ability to 
                                                 
210  See generally Margaret Kim & Robert E. Jones, Commentary, Public Participation with Chinese 
Characteristics, in CHINA ENVIRONMENT SERIES 2006, at 98-102, available at 
http://www.ecolinx.org/press/CEF_Commentaries%201-4.pdf. 
211  Yuhong Zhao, supra note 52, at 176.  To establish standing, certain conditions must be met: “the 
plaintiff must be a citizen, legal person, or organization having a direct interest with the case; there must be 
a specific defendant; there must be a concrete claim, a factual basis, and a cause for the lawsuit; and, the 
lawsuit must be within the scope and jurisdiction of the court.”  Civil Procedure Law ch. 12, § 1, art. 108. 
212  Birdsong 1998, supra note 137, at 55. 
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understand and interpret complex legislation.213  Specialization may also 
improve consistency, which allows for greater predictability214 and has the 
potential to enhance efficiency.215  Moreover, specialization may have a 
positive impact on public opinion.216  Expertise is improved in a specialized 
court both through initial appointments and continued education.  The 
creation of a specialized unit makes it more feasible to hire staff composed 
at least partly of specialists, and expertise continues to develop as a result of 
repetition in subject matter.217 
The positive impact on public opinion and greater predictability both 
offer the Chinese government a reason to adopt a specialized court.  Both of 
these effects could draw further economic investment from foreign 
corporations into the country.218  More predictable and effective enforcement 
of existing environmental laws also has the potential to increase the appeal 
of using clean technology.219 
Having a special litigation forum where Chinese citizens can voice 
their concerns might ultimately improve the environmental protection 
system overall.  One scholar noted three benefits that increased litigation 
                                                 
213  STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE 8 (1990).  One article suggests that “environmental 
education and related technical training for officialdom and the judiciary” is one measure that could assist 
in enhancing the effectiveness of environmental law in China.  Alford & Shen, supra note 61, at 419. 
214  LEGOMSKY, supra note 213, at 12.  “[E]xpertise breeds consistency within a specialized field.”  Id. 
215  Id. at 16-17. 
216  Id. at 19. 
217  Id. at 8. 
218  If citizens believe the government is attempting to remedy environmental problems and feel they 
have a place to voice concerns, then social instability is less likely.  Studies suggest that social instability 
and volatility affect the amount of foreign direct investment in a country.  See Ivar Kolstad & Espen 
Villanger, How Does Social Development Affect FDI and Domestic Investment?, p. 10, Chr. Michelsen 
Institute Development Studies and Human Rights (2004), available at 
www.cmi.no/publications/file/?1756=how-does-social-development-affect-fdi-and; Joshua Aizenman & 
Nancy Marion, Volatility, Investment, and Disappointment Aversion, p. 15, Working Paper 5386, National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series (1995); AYMO BRUNETTI & BEATRICE WEDER, 
INVESTMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DIFFERENT UNCERTAINTY 
MEASURES 11 (The World Bank & Int’l Fin. Corp. 1997).  But see Oladipo Busari & Lloyd 
Amaghionyeodiwe, Private Investment and Political Instability: Evidence from Nigeria, INT’L J. OF 
APPLIED ECON. & QUANTITATIVE STUD., Vol. 4-2, 45, 64 (2007).  When people feel less secure about their 
health and property, this instability spawns uncertainty; uncertainty reduces investment.  See AYMO 
BRUNETTI & BEATRICE WEDER, INVESTMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
DIFFERENT UNCERTAINTY MEASURES 4 (The World Bank & Int’l Fin. Corp. 1997) (“The more common 
violence in the political process, the less secure are people and property.  Because this instability spawns 
uncertainty, it reduces investment according to the theoretical considerations”). 
219  As it currently stands, multinational companies believe that using cleaner technology to comply 
with environmental laws will allow cheaper, dirtier plants to undercut the complying companies’ profits; 
thus, many multinational companies do not use the same cleaner technologies in China that they use in 
other countries.  See ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK, supra note 7, at 200.  Most companies have 
cleaner technology available; if China wants to benefit from better technology, there will have to be 
predictability in enforcement.  See id. at 198-99. 
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could offer China:  improved environmental law-making,220 increased public 
awareness,221 and pressure on polluting industries.222  While these positive 
impacts of litigation have the potential to occur in the current Chinese legal 
system, these impacts would likely be amplified by the existence of an 
environmental court.  A specialized tribunal will likely increase the amount 
of environmental litigation.  This will occur because public awareness about 
environmental litigation will be raised by media attention to this new court 
and because citizens will likely feel that they will have more success in a 
court that specializes in understanding environmental laws and science.  
Ideally, the existence of a special forum for bringing environmental disputes 
should raise citizen awareness about environmental problems and about 
litigation as a dispute resolution tool. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
China has dealt itself a bad environmental hand.  To continue playing 
it is a losing proposition, with assured catastrophic consequences to the 
Chinese people.  The struggle to establish the rule of law as the final arbiter 
of environmental conflicts must begin with a credible legal process that 
offers participants and the public an impartial, efficient, and enforceable 
result.  Without question, many changes must occur within the legal system 
in order to accomplish this goal;223 however, these barriers should not delay 
the establishment of a specialized environmental court.  The success of the 
NZEC provides a model that can be modified to address the particular 
sensitivities of China’s culture and political system.  China must alter its 
                                                 
220  Litigation has the potential to improve environmental law-making because litigation more clearly 
defines the roles, rights, and responsibilities of parties by interpreting legislation.  Yuhong Zhao, supra note 
52, at 174.  Legislation is often vague and ambiguous; but when judges understand the laws, litigation 
allows courts to detect the gaps, loopholes, and other contradictions that exist within those laws.  Id.  The 
Standing Committee or the State Council can alter laws and regulations if a court interprets them in 
unexpected ways.  Id. 
221  Litigation creates ripple effects that raise public awareness.  Id.  When plaintiffs succeed in their 
challenges of polluting industries or destructive companies, these cases are reported in the media.  This 
allows others to “become aware of their environmental rights” and encourages others to take legal action to 
assert their rights.  Id. at 174-75.  One prominent environmental advocate—the head of the Legal Aid 
Centre for Pollution Victims in Beijing—sees environmental litigation as “the most effective way to 
disseminate the law and educate the public.”  Id. at 175. 
222  Litigation coerces polluting industries to pay attention to their environmental effects; perhaps 
economic pressure is the most effective tool in combating the destruction that economic growth has 
wrought.  Litigation allows victims to shift the cost of pollution to the polluters.  Even if every case is not 
successful, litigation will send a “clear and strong warning to other potential offenders that pollution 
prevention needs to be taken seriously.”  Yuhong Zhao, supra note 52, at 175. 
223  See generally Christine J. Lee, “Pollute First, Control Later” No More: Combating 
Environmental Degradation in China Through An Approach Based in Public Interest Litigation and Public 
Participation, 17 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 795 (2008). 
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course in order to protect the country’s important natural resources and to 
make the country a healthy place for its citizens.  Adopting a specialized 
court will stimulate the country’s potentially powerful environmental 
regulatory framework.  The specific aspects of this specialized court could 
be developed through modification of China’s maritime courts and the 
NZEC. 
Providing a new forum for environmental disputes will focus the 
country’s energy, which has long been used for economic growth and 
development, to create innovative solutions to China’s environmental 
problems.  In addition, an environmental court may inspire world leaders to 
assist China in solving the country’s environmental difficulties; other 
countries and multi-national corporations could provide technology and 
knowledge to support China’s movement towards environmental 
sustainability.  China must provide some signal to others that it is willing 
and able to correct the country’s environmental devastation; creating a 
special court could be just the indication necessary.  It is important for China 
to find a balance between economic viability and environmental 
sustainability, and creating an environment court is one step on the path to 
this equilibrium. 
